The central questions of the Arab uprisings-what 
Find this book:
Hussein Ali Agrama was f inishing the manuscript f or his book in late 2011 as the dramatic events that would eventually result in the ousting of Hosni Mubarak unf olded in Egypt. Questioning Secularism nevertheless provides a compelling lens through which to make sense of recent developments in Egypt, including ongoing f orms of revolutionary mobilisation, the actions of a f irmly entrenched 'deep-state', and attempts by various political elites to usurp revolutionary legitimacy. Combining insights f rom the anthropology of religion and law, the book makes two key claims: that liberal secularism is one of the principal means through which modern state power operates, and that spaces of 'asecularity' are the most evident means by which this power is resisted.
Agrama starts f rom the premise that, with respect to the modern state, the domains of the religious and the secular must be understood as 'mutually constitutive of each other' though of ten in 'tense and contradictory ways' (p. 1). Agrama begins by grappling with a paradox posed by Talal Asad's contention that 'the concepts, assumptions, sensibilities, and practices of secularism as a doctrine' of ten work in a way 'to undermine secularism as a modern political arrangement' (p. 2). Agrama takes the secularism puzzle one step f urther, by seeking to understand not only why this undermining occurs, but also the modes and modalities through which it occurs. In order to do so, he makes the case f or examining secularism as a 'problem-space, constituted by a historical ensemble of questions and stakes and characterized by continual contestation' (105).
In order to explore these tensions and paradoxes of secularism as it moves f rom doctrine to practice, Agrama examines the case of Egypt. T his may seem a counterintuitive case by which to explore modern secularity, given the primary place of religion in the Egyptian state even bef ore the Muslim Brotherhood's ascent to power. But through a discussion of how state interventions in a 'liberal direction' (p. 3) have transf ormed even those areas of the Egyptian legal and institutional f ramework that clearly seem guided by religion and religious law, the author argues that Egypt is the ideal case to explore the 'deeper anxieties' concerning 'contemporary secularity and our abilities to def ine and secure it' (p. 3).
Islam as Discursive Tradition
In order to understand the dynamics of these legal transf ormations, and the af f ective-conceptual structures through which they f unction, Agrama undertakes a detailed ethnography of both the personal status courts and the Fatwa Council of Al-Azhar, both of which derive their decisions f rom Shari'a and deal with overlapping issues, in particular in relation to the private af f airs of f amily. Although, as Agrama argues, the courts have come to operate according to very dif f erent 'conceptual and af f ective relationships' they nonetheless share similar roots in the set of 19 th century British colonial-era legal and institutional ref orms, when 'the active principle of secularism, a public/private distinction, and a rule of law f ramework' came to be established (p100).
As Agrama points out, it was only relatively recently that the f atwa and the court were separated into 'exclusive spaces of their own', entailing a gradual process of liberal legal ref orm that 'aimed at bringing the Shari'a under the rule of law' (p. 111). From then on, the courts would consist of a space in which all those f eatures of the 'rule of law' would be invested, whereas the Fatwa Council would address those aspects 'deemed irrelevant to the rule of law'. As such, a comparison between the courts and the council enables Agrama to highlight and map the complex interactions between two seeming disparate legal traditions and the resulting transf ormations that occur in the way in which Sharia' is understood and practiced. In doing so, he also f acilitates a more general understanding of the ways in which authority f unctions in the modern state (p.111).
T he 'Law's Suspicion' and Fatwa's Authority
One of the key conclusions derived f rom this comparison is the distinction between the type of authority on display through the Fatwa Councils, in which rulings are of ten f ollowed despite their non-binding character, as opposed to those of the personal status courts, which, though intended to be binding, are generally only f ollow when combined with some f orm of enf orcement measure (p. 119). Many of the examples provided pertain to issues of marriage and divorce.
At the risk of over-simplif ication, Agrama argues that the reason the personal status courts are approached with greater suspicion, and are theref ore denied the authority of the Fatwa Council, has to do with the modes and mechanisms by which liberal power operates. Most importantly, liberalism's construction of the law as 'subsequent to an a priori f ree self and theref ore a suspect mode of domination external to it.' In this sense, 'vigilance and suspicion' mutually enable the f unction and legitimacy of a liberal legal (and political) system. T hese are not 'natural, def ault conditions, but are instead historically cultivated sensibilities whose cultivation depends integrally on modern legal processes' (p. 127).
In this sense, one could conclude that the most ef f ective means of resisting modern state power is not through vigilance and suspicion, but rather through the construction of an altogether separate space of authority. Putting aside important normative concerns over the alternative f orms of exclusion and hierarchy such conf igurations might produce, Agrama comes to understand Fatwas as an area existing outside of the liberal state's sovereign power (p. 180). In occupying a space of 'asecularity', Fatwas theref ore resist the 'mode of power' that is derived f rom 'vigilance against power' (p. 179).
T he National Security State and Sovereign State Power
In chapter six and then again in the epilogue, the book examines the relationship between the national security state and f orms of sovereign state power. Here Agrama argues that the national security state inf rastructure is a natural outcome of the expansion of liberal, secular power into the Egyptian state. T his process results in the 'normalization of constant threat' and the transf ormation of the 'emergency response into a disposition of the state and of everyday lif e' (p. 232). T his analysis has wide-ranging implications f or how we understand Egypt's decades-old national security state as well as the implications and logic of national security elsewhere in the world, in particular in light of the 'war on terror'. For Agrama, the f urther entanglement of national security with secularist doctrine has, paradoxically, enabled 'the growth of religiously rooted and resonant languages of justice' (223).
T hough the book contains a compelling ethnography of the discourses and practices of Islamist lawyers vis-a-vis the 'Egyptian emergency state', this component of the analysis perhaps could have been f urther enhanced by relating it back to a genealogy of the national security state, with its relationship to the other f orms of modern state power discussed in this book more explicitly stated. In addition, it would have been interesting to consider the place of (neo)liberal economic power in this equation. In particular considering how central demands f or social and economic justice were to the 2011 revolution, as well to the continuing f orms of revolutionary mobilisation.
T he Ongoing Revolution: Resisting or Reproducing Multiple forms of Sovereign State Power?
For Agrama, the revolutionary movement that emerged in late 2011 provided much cause f or optimism, in particular in its seeming ability to transcend the logic of suspicion linked to secular state power. By bringing together diverse sectors of society animated by a set of agreed upon principles, in particular 'that no oneno one person, group of people, social or economic class, religious or secular political orientation-should have a monopoly of power,' this movement, like the Fatwa Council, seemed to operate in a space of 'asecularity'. In this sense, it adopted a posture of 'indif f erence to the question of where to draw a line between religion and politics' (p. 232) Implicit in the protesters' demands was not only their rejection of 'the state of emergency that long obtained in Egypt but also against the underlying paradigm that had increasingly normalized it,' and which had alienated Egyptian citizens not only f rom the state but also f rom one another (p. 232).
Agrama's concluding sentence provocatively ties together the key themes of the book. 'What matters,' he argues 'is not whether Islamists or liberals succeed in parliament, but whether state sovereignty succeeds in f urther asserting itself into social lif e, the state retains or increases its monopoly on politics, and the conceptual-af f ective structures through which secular power works will f urther dispose us to the paradigm of national security, which has dominated the globe' (p. 235).
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